By the Executive Order 9 of 2026 Secretariat
The article authored by Mr. Eze Onyekpere and published in Blueprint Newspaper on 9 March 2026 questioning the legality of Executive Order 9 of 2026 (EO9) presents its conclusions with striking certainty.
However, while the tone suggests a settled constitutional verdict, the legal reasoning offered does not sustain such a conclusion. What appears in the article is less a rigorous constitutional critique than a confident assertion built on a fundamental analytical misunderstanding.
At the centre of the argument lies the claim that the existence of the Petroleum Industry Act (PIA), 2021 effectively disables the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria from issuing directives touching on petroleum revenue administration. That proposition is neither supported by constitutional doctrine nor by the structure of executive authority under Nigeria’s constitutional framework.
The first weakness in the argument is its failure to identify, with precision, what Executive Order 9 is alleged to have unlawfully done. EO9 has not repealed the PIA. It has not amended any provision of the Act.
It has not suspended statutory obligations established by the National Assembly. Nor has it attempted to legislate in place of the legislature. These distinctions are critical.
For any allegation of illegality to stand, it must be demonstrated that the executive instrument in question has displaced or altered statutory rights, duties, or institutional structures created by law. No such demonstration has been made.
Instead, the critique rests on a broader but legally unsustainable assertion: that once a sector is regulated by statute, the President is precluded from issuing executive directives affecting its administration. That interpretation misunderstands the nature of executive authority under Section 5 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended). The Constitution vests the executive powers of the Federation in the President and charges the office with the execution and maintenance of the Constitution and laws enacted by the National Assembly.
The President, therefore, is not a passive observer of statutory administration. As the head of the executive branch, he bears the constitutional responsibility to ensure that laws are implemented faithfully, coherently, and in a manner consistent with the broader constitutional framework. Executive orders are among the recognised administrative instruments through which such coordination and supervision occur.
The mere presence of legislation does not extinguish executive authority. Nearly every major sector of governance operates within statutory frameworks, yet their implementation necessarily involves executive direction, policy coordination, and institutional oversight. An executive order becomes unlawful only where it contradicts existing law, nullifies statutory provisions, or exceeds constitutional limits. None of these conditions has been established in relation to EO9.
A further difficulty in the critique is the conflation of two separate propositions. The first, that the Petroleum Industry Act establishes an operational and fiscal structure for the petroleum sector, is correct. The second, that every administrative practice undertaken under that framework is automatically constitutional and immune from executive correction, is not. Statutes establish structures, but they do not sanctify every interpretation subsequently advanced under them, nor every administrative practice that evolves in their implementation.
In constitutional governance, statutes remain subordinate to the Constitution. Where statutory interpretation or administrative practice raises questions regarding compliance with constitutional provisions
particularly those relating to revenues accruing to the Federation, the executive has both the authority and the responsibility to ensure that implementation remains constitutionally sound.
This is the central issue that the critique fails to address. The debate surrounding EO9 is not merely about sectoral administration; it concerns the integrity of the Federation Account, which occupies a central place in Nigeria’s fiscal architecture. The Federation Account represents the constitutional mechanism through which revenues accruing to the Federation are brought into public custody and distributed across the three tiers of government. Its integrity directly affects national budgeting, fiscal transparency, and macroeconomic stability.
Any administrative practice or statutory interpretation that potentially weakens the constitutional flow of revenues into the Federation Account inevitably raises issues of constitutional significance. In such circumstances, the President is not required to remain passive while awaiting judicial determination or legislative amendment.
The executive branch retains the authority to issue administrative directives aimed at ensuring more faithful compliance with constitutional fiscal requirements while broader institutional processes remain available.
To argue otherwise would effectively reduce the executive office to administrative inertia, an outcome neither contemplated nor supported by the Constitution.
It is also important to clarify that decisive executive action does not automatically amount to constitutional overreach. The Constitution prohibits executive action without legal foundation; it does not prohibit executive leadership in safeguarding public revenue administration.
Executive Order 9 is grounded precisely in the President’s constitutional responsibility to oversee the execution of laws and preserve the integrity of Nigeria’s public finance system.
Concerns have also been raised that measures such as EO9 could undermine investor confidence.
Such fears are misplaced. Investors are not attracted to opacity, ambiguous revenue arrangements, or uncertain fiscal oversight. On the contrary, investment thrives in environments characterised by transparency, legal certainty, and institutional clarity.
Strengthening remittance discipline and reinforcing constitutional revenue processes ultimately enhance, rather than weaken, the credibility of Nigeria’s fiscal governance.
None of this suggests that EO9 is beyond debate. In a democratic society, policy instruments and administrative directives must remain open to scrutiny and discussion.
Reasonable observers may hold differing views regarding aspects of implementation, scope, or long-term legislative harmonisation. However, such debate must begin with an accurate representation of the legal issues involved.
Executive Order 9 does not nullify the Petroleum Industry Act. Rather, it seeks to ensure that the implementation of the Act does not evolve in ways that undermine the constitutional framework governing the Federation’s revenues.
The distinction is fundamental.
In the final analysis, the claim of illegality advanced against EO9 remains unsubstantiated. The critique does not demonstrate that the Order repeals or amends existing legislation. It does not establish that the President lacks constitutional authority to direct executive institutions in the administration of public revenues. Nor does it show that practices defended under the PIA are insulated from constitutional scrutiny.
Until such burdens are met, the allegation of illegality remains not a legal conclusion but a polemical assertion.
Executive Order 9 of 2026 is therefore not a constitutional violation. It is a constitutional corrective designed to reinforce the integrity of Nigeria’s public revenue administration.
Signed:
Tanimu Yakubu
Secretary
Executive Order 9 of 2026 Implementation Committee Secretariat